4. Phenomenological Identity
"I expect to wake up as myself tomorrow," says every person ever, "and every other day for the rest of my life. If someone with my exact genes is born, they are different from me. But if I completely change over 50 years, it's still me. This is all very obvious and normal. If I'm cloned, then it's not me even though the other entity is physically identical. Unless I die first, in which case I have to admit it is me since dying and t hen being cloned is a well-known concept used in science fiction for teleportation, also it's basically what happens in every normal moment anyway. So it somehow depends on the order in which (dying, being cloned) happens because that totally sounds like a thing that could be true. Also it several clones are created or the experiment is tweaked in a bunch of other ways, my position necessarily becomes incoherent or nonsensical. The above is obviously the only correct theory and is obviously true, obviously."
"Maybe you're identical to everyone?" says the Open Individualist.
"LOL don't be ridiculous," says every person ever. "Sounds like spiritual Buddhist woo. Have you taken LSD? Normal very serious people don't believe in such hippy things".
The mistake: treating yourself as special. No, there aren't any irreducible continuous entities in the universe that remember who something happens to. This contradicts reductionism, there is precisely zero room for something like this in physics, it doesn't survive thought experiments, and there is zero evidencefor it. Qualia having identity is no more coherent than matter having identity.