The doping and speeding analogies illuminate some of the hidden depths of Personman's argument.
Speeding, as was said, is something basically everyone does. The speed limit is not really enforced unless you're driving way, way over it. As a result, just about everyone drives a decent ten miles over the speed limit. As a result, there's a lot of pressure to drive ten miles over the speed limit. But there's still a rule on the books saying you can't. But it's not enforced; you can drive ten over right by a police cruiser. They won't pull you over. But maybe they will!
Doping is also against the rules, but for a time in the 90s, this rule was not enforced in professional sports. This created a lot of pressure to violate the rules. Players saw other players taking performance enhancements, and thus performing better, and they weren't being punished.
If you are caught in the jurisdiction of a rules-system like this, than you are trapped in a sort of double-bind. The system is constantly sending you conflicting messages: "don't break the rules," and "break the rules."
An ethically designed system of rules actually should, I think, take into account the enforaceabililty of each rule so as to avoid placing its constituents in this double-bind. If a rule can't be enforced, either because there aren't enough resources or because the rule is by its nature unenforceable, then there's a larger burden in justifying the rule's existence. The rule should in this case be necessary to protect a larger principle. That is, a good rule should be principled, or it should be enforceable, or both. But it can't be both arbitrary and unenforceable.
It was exactly these criteria that were honored in the evolution from Throne Room to King's Court. The rule that Throne Room <i>must</i> find an action was unenforceable. And it was arbitrary. So it was deleted. King's Court, the newer card, <i>may</i> find an action.
So Personman's argument for changing the rules based on their unenforceability is perfectly valid. Either he's wrong, and the rules can be enforced, or he's right, and the rule needs to be justified on higher grounds. That principled justification seems like it's going to be especially challenging if you don't also object to the tepid point-counter that's much more mainstream.
Personman's argument isn't an excuse to violate the rules -- it doesn't make it okay to cheat on your spouse. But it is part of a good argument for <i>changing</i> the rules. Or, redefining the terms of the marriage, to Throne Room the marriage metaphor.
Or, to Throne Room the Throne Room metaphor, Personman's argument doesn't allow that people who cheated with Throne Room weren't cheating. They were. But it does hold King's Court to be an ethically superior card.